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Abstract. The paper presents a philosophical proposition of elucidating creativity by means of dis-
tinguishing the category of intentionality. The intentional dimension of cognitive content encom-
passes predispositions for constructing sign systems. Such an intellectual modification of sign sys-
tems forms the foundation of dynamic creative acts. However, creative processes are not restricted 
to the sphere of intellectual operations, but also remain under the influence of object categories. For 
this reason, the results of creative processes must allow for the potential determinants of sensual 
matter. A transition between the subjective sphere of possibility and the objective sphere of potency 
indicates the dynamism of the process. A crucial component of the emergence of intentional rela-
tions is formulating the criterion of a creative process. It determines the rules of constructing sign 
systems, the forms of acceptable transformations as well as the possible modes of allowing for the 
results of this process.
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Introduction
A pragmatic approach in creativity studies has resulted in forming numerous conceptions 
in which the subjective aspect is prevalent. The development of interdisciplinary studies 
in cognitive science as well as in experimental psychology has extended the knowledge on 
man’s cognitive capacities and the workings of the human psyche. This has enabled more 
detailed research into the problem of creativity and the methods of improving it. Creativity 
has ceased to be regarded solely as an artistic act from the domain of art, but it has started 
to be qualified as each person’s capacity. Creativity is perceived now as a personality element 
constituting one of the essential conditions of man functioning in the world (Tatarkiewicz, 
1980, pp. 257–261; Adomaitytė et al., 2018). Such a diagnosis seems to be proper, however 
it has not been fully elucidated yet.
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The development of creativity studies is manifested by attempts at formulating an ad-
equate definition of creativity. In the methodological context, this condition not only deter-
mines the manner of conceiving of creativity but it also delineates its scope with the view 
to univocally apprehending its inherent elements. Most definitions position the essence of 
creativity between originality and effectiveness, at the same time emphasizing the value of 
obtained products. However, a product always constitutes a result of a process. Therefore, an 
important element of creativity studies is calling attention to its dynamic nature (Corazza, 
2016). Highlighting the potency factor in the context of dynamism broadens the research 
field of the workings of creativity. One also indicates the need for the development of man’s 
creative potential by stressing discovery and seeking new possibilities of accomplishing it 
(Martin & Wilson, 2017, pp. 419–423). However, regarding potency as a dynamizing fac-
tor requires an explanation of the manner of arriving at acts of creativity on this basis. The 
condition constituting creative acts are epistemic relations, in which the subject’s potency is 
actualized under the influence of an object of cognition. The participation of object factors 
in creativity processes is elucidated by means of distinguishing the category of intentional-
ity. It is understood as a mode of mentally grasping the cognized states of things in their 
sign dimension. Husserl’s (2006, 2008) understanding of intentionality as a conscious way 
of presenting object data provided the grounds for the constitution of a qualitative structure 
of the immanent objectivity (Smith, 1982, pp. 87–152). On the basis of phenomenology, the 
structuring of intentional acts became a causal factor determining all objectivity. Therefore, 
intentionality became an indispensable component of research in philosophical epistemology. 
Intentionality is an expression of the presence of creative factors in the processes of intellec-
tual cognition. However, in the perspective of creative processes, the field of intentional acts 
extends beyond intellectual cognition and constitutes a constructional moment, conditioned 
by the potential properties of non-mental reality. Thus, the epistemic aspect of creativity 
requires a broader, philosophical research context.
The text focuses on the presentation of the creativity process in the context of the fac-
tors by virtue of which it can occur. Due to the ambiguous nature of the process and the 
specific character of the mental factors involved in it, the method of this study has been 
defined as reconstruction. This approach indicates the crucial role of the category of in-
tentionality in elucidating creativity processes. Deriving inspiration from the studies in the 
field of the philosophical theory of being, and in particular from the position of the Lublin 
philosophical school, the author emphasizes the ontic value of intentional acts (Krąpiec & 
Maryniarczyk, 2010, pp. 23–36, 89–102; Kamiński, 2018; Chudy, 2018). On the basis of the 
research of the school, and especially in the position of Krąpiec, we find an original proposal 
of formulating the relationship that holds between the intentional dimension of intellectual 
acts and the creation of cultural works (1983, pp. 167–184). On this basis, my proposal for 
understanding creative processes will be formulated in this article, taking into account the 
participation of potentially conditioned sensual matter. Creativity constitutes the result of 
a multi-step relationship, which holds between a subjective cognitive sphere and the extra-
mental reality. The results of such a process may have their continuation, should they be 
expressed in some type of sensual matter. This is not a precondition for creative acts. How-
ever, it provides the possibility of verifying the value of creative acts. The suggested solution 
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may complement the interdisciplinary studies into creative processes. A philosophical look 
at the phenomenon of creativity results in the fact that they cease to be hermetic and verifi-
able only in a specific model.
1. Epistemic foundations of creative acts
Man’s cognitive orientation, both in the material and formal orders, provides the basis for the 
occurrence of creative processes. On the one hand, it accumulates cognitive content, form-
ing the intellectual body of knowledge, which enables the emergence of creative acts. On the 
other hand, what is important is also a formal dimension of cognition enabling the formation 
of the intellectual construction of thinking processes. However, it does not signify limiting 
creativity to the epistemic domain. Rather it indicates the presence of cognitive acts in all 
personal human acts. They play the role of a source providing cognitive content and a factor 
enabling the transformation of the cognized content. At this juncture, it may be argued that 
creativity processes are epistemically grounded, since creativity processes require allowing 
for a cognitive act as an act of reading the structure of reality. An adequate cognitive grasp of 
reality provides a wide content scope, in which the structural factors of the cognized thing are 
equally not ignored. It is a sign-producing operation consisting in the intellectual production 
of the signs of things being cognized. The ensuing intentional moment enables an intellectual 
transformation of the sign, opening up the possibility of generating creative acts.
The cognition process itself already encompasses a creative moment. It involves a trans-
formation of states of things transcendental in relation to the subject. As a result of this 
process, they assume the form of non-material modes of grasping content in the awareness 
of the cognizing agent. Grasping a content is aimed at comprehending what we cognize. It 
reveals itself in the consciousness of the cognizing agent as the meaning of a thing derived 
from the content. Cognitive contents in this process are not something independent, but 
they constitute an epistemic fashion of grasping concrete things. Therefore, contents involve 
individual data conditioned by the place and time, which do not fall within the scope of the 
meaning itself. The meaning is formed by deriving what is general and constant from the 
grasped contents. These functions in consciousness as a notion, i.e., a sign of the thing be-
ing cognized. In Krąpiec we find the conception of the cognition process, which emphasizes 
the specific character of the moment of transition from an extra-mentally existing thing to 
its conscious grasp in the intellect. It consists in the intellectual creation of a formal repre-
sentation of the thing. Thereby in cognitive processes, there occurs a transformation of the 
content of the cognized thing into what constitutes the meaning of this thing in conscious-
ness (Krąpiec, 1983, pp. 152–157). Consequently, the existential moment of a cognized thing 
is transformed into an intentional moment. A mental grasp of the cognized states of things 
in their sign dimension assumes the form of intentional sign systems. They constitute sub-
jectively grasped and intellectually ordered cognitive contents, which acquire, to a certain 
extent, an independent mode of mental functioning. In our research, this conception will 
provide one of the bases for reconstructing the creative act.
We have pointed out that in formulating cognitive contents there occurs a transforma-
tion of the existential moment of the cognized thing. The existential moment determines 
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the concreteness of the existence of a thing. We are unable to keep this moment in a cogni-
tive grasp of a thing. The theory of being indicates that it is not possible to construct a sign 
of the existence of something. Despite the fact that the grasped cognitive content primarily 
becomes a sign of a particular thing being cognized, its concreteness disappears in the in-
tentional dimension. In cognitive acts, an intellectual modification of the cognitive content 
takes place. It is grounded in the pursuit for generalizing these contents. At the same time, 
there occurs a cognitive pursuit for rejecting individual properties of these things, i.e., the 
ones, which are not necessary to grasp a thing intellectually. This is why, for example, an 
intellectual grasp of a chair has neither a size nor a color. Thus, this process entails a radi-
cal transformation of both the existential moment and the individual properties of a thing 
(Krąpiec, 1990, pp. 192–197). On the one hand, the content is separated from the specific 
existence of a cognized thing; on the other hand, the content itself is reorganized. An ontic 
perspective becomes an epistemic perspective, additionally dependent on subjective cognitive 
determinants. In the cognitive order, this constitutes the primary modifying moment of the 
cognized object. This leads to obtaining a sign representation of the object as a mental state. 
Nevertheless, despite this modification, the representation of a cognized object is conditioned 
by the reality of this object. At this stage, it constitutes merely its sign. The specific character 
of this stage is determined by the truth-oriented moment at which a system of content ad-
equate to the cognized thing is cognitively forged.
Forming sign representations does not constitute purely creative acts. For the participa-
tion of the cognizing subject in this process is conditioned by the content of the thing being 
cognized, whereas the aim of the process is to recreate the content in its relational system, 
and not to create a new one. A cognizing subject many times performs cognitive acts in a 
spontaneous, even natural manner. However, while recreating a content, a subject is inca-
pable of grasping the cognized thing comprehensively, since human cognition is an aspect 
of cognition not necessarily grasping the very thing substantially in a spontaneous grasp. 
Therefore, at the level of reflected cognition, a precise sign grasp of the content takes place 
by means of complementing and ordering the system of relations holding in the cognized 
thing. This is still not a purely perceptive stage, since at the level of reflected cognition, it 
is possible to engage in the cognized content of subjective factors coming from the outside 
of the cognized thing (Kamiński & Krąpiec, 2020, pp. 20–42). What is meant here are in 
particular factors coming from the sphere of memory and imagination. For this reason, at a 
reflected level there may occur acts of forming notions as signs of the cognized thing. Thus, 
an intentional domain is created for which the criterion of correspondence to the cognized 
thing remains fundamental.
The intentional moment occurring at the level of reflected cognition displays the potential 
nature of a cognitive process. It consists in the subject’s capacity for constructing a system 
of sign relations. They do not necessarily have to be conditioned by what is current that is 
by the existing thing. It is the subject, who decides whether, with respect to the thing being 
cognized, they will apply the correspondence criterion between the system of signs being 
constructed and the very thing being cognized. Were there no potency in cognitive acts, 
there would also be no possibility of modifying the system of sign relations and of formulat-
ing the correspondence criterion. In cognitive processes, it is the thing being cognized that 
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is the reference point. Whereas the subject, being adequate to the thing, only realizes their 
cognitive potency. A cognizing subject has an inherent capacity for cognizing things. They 
also have the possibility of operating a system of sign relations in such a manner that the 
cognized content may be adequate to the thing being cognized. A manifestation of this cor-
respondence is the classical definition of truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei. The cognitive 
potency moment of the subject provides the grounds for accomplishing the process adequate 
to the cognized thing. In the cognitive order, this is the first modification of cognized content. 
Therefore, its result is termed as primary intentionality in the theory of being.
The subjective intentional sphere is not constrained to purely cognitive acts. Cognition 
results may undergo modifications by constructing intentional sign relations. They may pro-
vide grounds for critical thinking or for formulating thought experiments (Yi, 2018). Thought 
processes as intellectual operations on signs enable a recreation of a network of relations. 
They are identical to the relations in the cognized thing itself. However, it is also possible to 
construct a system of relations, which is not grounded in the cognized things themselves. 
They are founded on potency states, resulting from potential capacities of signs for creating 
diverse relation systems. What one deals with then are intellectual sign operations constitut-
ing a consequence of mental cognitive processes. The correspondence criterion is substituted 
in them by a different criterion. Each criterion of operating intellectual sign relations, which 
is not formulated with regard to correspondence constitutes a creativity criterion. Thus, signs 
created in relation to the cognized thing provide the grounds for thought processes, which 
concentrate on speculative or constructive systems of sign relations. The field of the possibility 
of these operations taking place may occur in the order of content and scope. At the level of 
primary intentionality, the only factor determining creative acts are logical thinking principles.
A moment of cognitive activity does not take place in man in an isolated manner. Cre-
ative acts do not originate solely in the intellectual sphere. They also involve sensual cognitive 
powers. Within the framework of the epistemic unity of the subject, the functions of sensual 
and emotional powers are distinguished due to their exceptional importance in creative pro-
cesses. A particular part is played in this respect by the imaginative sphere, which constitutes 
a key contributor in relation to the intellectual sphere. At the level of imagination, creative 
possibilities are visualized by virtue of associating impressions with sensual cognition. Im-
pressions do not refer to the intellectual sphere of notions, but to concrete sensual data. How-
ever, they hold a direct relationship with intellectual operations on signs. Nevertheless, in a 
creative process, impressions not only constitute a graphic realization of intellectual opera-
tions. For, it is already as part of impressions that there may occur sensual creative processes, 
which constitute graphic modifications of sensual data. Impressions, aided by memory, may 
overlap with other impressions, the relation, of which is grasped by the intellect. Thanks to 
this, there may occur creative processes consisting in the synthesis of impressionary sensual 
data. In the intentional order, this also provides grounds for constructing impressionary 
elements. The ability to handle sensual data in the context of intellectual sign structures 
constitutes a fundamental function of imagination. For this reason, the role of imagination 
in creative processes is defined as cognitive manipulation (Stokes, 2014, pp. 171–177). By 
virtue of imagination, a creative process is concretized based on sensual impressions. It is an 
important factor connecting creative acts with the domain of the intersubjective appraisal 
of their value.
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Creative acts are associated with discerning in the cognitive structure of a thing the 
possibility of its intellectual modification. The accumulated cognitive data constitute the in-
tentional material based on which such thought operations may take place. The principal 
property of these operations is the capacity for formulating intentional sign constructions. 
It is from exercising this capacity that all creative processes begin. Whereas formulating the 
intentional constructions of this process is accomplished by choosing a criterion, we un-
derstand it as a method of organizing and processing a system of sign relations. Therefore, 
creative processes encompass three essential moments of 1) initiating a creative act as the 
purpose of acting, 2) constructing possible criteria for a system of sign relations for this act 
and 3) selecting a specific criterion. Each of these elements affects the formation and course 
of a creative process. The purpose of a creative act is understood as the motives, which initi-
ate the formation of such processes. The moment of the possibility of constructing a content 
is distinguished by seeking various manners of grasping systems of sign relations, created 
on the basis of cognitive data, while the freedom of creative acts is expressed by choice. It is 
conceived of as a possibility of selecting such and not another manner of constructing sign 
systems. This is how the primary constitution of the creative process takes place. At this 
stage, it constitutes a combination of intellectual construction factors and decision factors 
manifested by formulating the criterion of constructing sign systems.
2. The specific character of intentionality in formulating the creativity criterion
The methodology of formulating a criterion delineating the workings of a creative process 
is not constrained to subjective acts of constructing sign systems. The primary form of 
intentionality emerging from cognitive acts is not a condition sufficient for the complete 
emergence of personal creative processes. It is also essential to transition from subjectively 
initiated creative acts to the inter-subjective execution of the constructed sign systems. Dis-
covering the possibilities of employing these constructions constitutes an element of the cre-
ative process. The inter-subjective dimension of the value of creative acts may be verified by 
applying the discovered possibilities or by subjecting them to social assessment. This occurs 
at the interface between intentionality and extra-psychic material in which a constructed sign 
system is realized. Such a realization may at the same time play the function of an interper-
sonal message. The results of its construction have the form of a communication. The form 
of a communication is assumed by each work of art. Also, other creative actions have some 
form of social fulfillment in the sphere of intention or performance. This is why formulating 
the criterion of the creative process requires taking into account the stage of accomplishing 
the result of the process in the construction phase.
Since creative processes are based on signs, being a derivative of human cognitive pro-
cesses, the reference point for the criterion cannot be only the sphere of intentional sign 
systems. For in cognitive acts we refer to transcendental, with regard to the subject, real 
states of things, deriving cognitive content from them. Thus, states of things are a material 
source for subjective creative operations. At the same time, real states of things constitute the 
place of accomplishing externalized results of these operations. Displaying the specific char-
acter of the realization of a creative process requires its reconstruction in which generalized 
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intellectual sign systems provide the grounds for creating a concrete, really existing thing. 
This will not be a straightforward transition from subjective content to objective content, 
because what is general does not involve concretization in itself. This is why concretization 
requires a concretizing factor, i.e., providing an opportunity for the result of an intellectual 
construction to be executed. In this situation, the concretizing factor is a type of matter. This 
does not need to be matter conceived physically, in which a creative idea is executed, like for 
instance a sculpture in stone. This may be a creative use of body organs, like for example dur-
ing voice production or making a gesture, since the human body, apart from all its organic 
functions, also plays a crucial communicative role. At this juncture, one also indicates the 
use of conventional language signs, playing the function of a formal carrier for the commu-
nicated creative acts. Due to the communicative aspect, all forms of executing creative acts 
in the extra-psychic domain may be defined as sensual matter.
Sensual matter enables a wide range of manners of executing intentional sign construc-
tions. However, each form of matter functions as something shaped by a system of parts, by a 
shape, or by rules. Sensual matter is not in a state of ontic readiness for intentional possibili-
ties to be executed in it. This is why discerning the manner of executing what is intentional 
in sensual material must, at the same time, be a discovery of the potency of this material. In 
the context of creativity studies, one needs to stress the difference between possibility and 
capability. We have already pointed out the specific character of intentional states, the basis 
for which is provided by logical principles of thinking. Possibility pertains primarily to the 
principle of non-contradiction – what is non-contradictory is possible. In the intentional 
order, it is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of acts of thought. Whereas in the ontic 
order, we are dealing with established systems of things which involve potency factors deter-
mining the acceptability and the scope of transformations in a given system (Krąpiec, 1991, 
pp. 225–226). This connection of intentional possibility with ontic capability is a manifesta-
tion of the degree of complication, which occurs in creative processes. Additionally, there 
are structural conditions of human action itself. They assume the form of decision acts in 
which the media of executing intentional constructions are selected. Discerning the interface 
that holds between the two orders is of essential significance for shaping the criterion of the 
creation and execution of a creative process.
Like in every human action, also in creative processes there occur causal determinants 
depicting this process from a causal perspective. The principal cause in the description and 
elucidation of action is a teleological cause, which constitutes the motive for the undertaken 
actions. The selection of means to achieve an end, especially in moral action, is largely deter-
mined by a motive. Whereas in creative processes, the order of occurrence of causes seems 
to be a secondary matter, since this process may involve various types of conditions and 
contexts, which affect its course. Subjective inspirations influencing creative activity cannot 
be limited to a definite range of means. In this case, what is of value is both the end of ac-
tion and concentration on the selected means. Often there occurs a situation in which, under 
the influence of the selected means, the intentional construction of a work is perfected or 
the end of this action is modified. This complicates the manner in which the structure of 
creative action is shaped methodologically and obstructs the acquisition of such an ability in 
educational processes (Beghetto & Karwowski, 2018, pp. 148–151). This does not mean that 
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creativity cannot be used in education. The grounds for methodicalness need to be sought 
in the sphere of the norms of constructing a product, taking into account the conditions of 
its emergence. A system of causal factors is accumulated in an adequately expressed criterion 
of the occurrence of a creative process.
As part of the constructed criterion of a creative process, there occurs a synthesis of the 
causal factors involved in this process. They have both a subjective and an objective dimen-
sion. In the subjective sphere, one selects intentionally constructed sign systems, the basis 
for which are acts of cognition of real states of things. Whereas in the objective sphere, one 
returns to real states of things, in which the results of a creative process are expressed. The 
criterion of a creative process is constituted in the thus forged relational transition. The pro-
cess is conditioned by three causal criteria: the end of a process, the manner of externalizing 
an intentional construction and the material by means of which the result of the process is 
manifested. They delineate what is decisive for creativity – the interface between intentional 
constructions and the real grounds for their realization, i.e., the material undergoing direct 
or indirect transformations. This intentional-transformational relation seems to be the pivotal 
moment for the whole creativity process.
What is crucial for the formulation of the criterion is the dynamism inherent in the 
manner of executing a creative process. Its construction does not involve constant, univocal 
elements, but analogously conceived, causatively conditioned transformations. In this regard, 
what acquires particular significance is the sensual matter thanks to which the intentional 
construction may be externalized. The possibility of executing an intentional construction 
is linked in sensual matter with ontic potency and with the realization of its final form 
(Krąpiec, 1983, pp. 179–182). Thus, an intentional construction is externalized and the mate-
rial in which it is expressed is molded. The intentionality of the construction extends in the 
creative process into the potency of the sensual material in which the external causes for its 
execution are accumulated. Therefore, the criterion must encompass the potential nature of 
sensual matter and the ontic dynamism of systems of things, in which the intentional con-
struction may be executed. The transition from potency to an act occurring at this stage is a 
manifestation of the dynamism of the creative process. The potency of the sensual material 
is overlaid with one of the possible intentional constructions. In the theory of being, this is 
defined as secondary intentionality.
Thus, the formulation of the criterion of a creative process is accomplished by means of 
constructing contents intentionally and by recognizing the rules of a possible implementation 
of this content. Therefore, already at the level of primary intentionality, a pre-requisite for the 
creative process is adjusting the construction of sign systems to the potency of the systems 
of things, involved in sensual matter. The rules of potential modification of the extra-psychic 
material delineate in this process the possible boundaries of the intentional construction of 
contents. This is not a narrow field, which is best shown by the development of discoveries 
in the domain of the physical laws of matter and of technical possibilities of modifying mat-
ter occurring under the influence of social postulates of scientific-technical advancement. 
A philosophical elucidation of the phenomenon of the potency of matter refers to the ontic 
structure of material things. The factor determining its mode of existence is a particular form 
of thing. The potency of sensual matter is limited by the formal factor, which delineates its 
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field of acceptable modifications (Krąpiec, 1991, pp. 350–375; Jaroszynski, 2002, pp. 49–54). 
Due to the recognition of the form of material things, the criterion of a creative process 
must encompass its execution in sensual matter. Therefore, the criterion needs to involve a 
method of an analogous application of intentional sign constructions by modifying the form 
of sensual matter. The transition to the level of secondary intentionality takes place by means 
of an appropriately constructed structure, analogous to real states.
The execution of a creative process gains thanks to the secondary intentionality of ontic 
supplement. At the same time, the possibility of verifying its value opens up. At this stage, 
the creative process enters the intersubjective field of the execution of intentional sign con-
structions. At the same time, it gains metaphysical grounds for the formation of the creative 
process, which is immanent in its essence. The factor ensuring the possibility of an ontic 
supplementation of this process is the parallelism holding between the cognized content, 
constituting the basis for sign constructions and the results obtained by means of employing 
this construction. Such a parallel is feasible thanks to the ambiguous fashion of constructing 
a sign structure of the content in creative acts. What one strives at in creative processes is 
not to develop necessary and constant intellectual content but to achieve a structure, which 
is possible to implement. Therefore, the rules grasped in cognizing and expressing the modes 
of existence of things become at the same time, the basis for executing creative processes in 
sensual matter. And in spite of the fact that a creative process is formulated at a level of intel-
lectual sign constructions, it still requires allowing for real object conditions. Thus, a creative 
act is to a certain extent guided by the ontic rules of the cognitively grasped things, which, 
at the same time, determine the scope of possibilities for its execution. An intellectual car-
rier of these rules are sign systems formulated analogously to the cognitively grasped things.
The discernment, by means of analogously grasped semantic systems, of potency in the 
structure of the cognized things provides the starting point for the execution of creative 
processes. Thus, the intellectual grasp of the cognized thing is a prerequisite to the creative 
process. This is the first construction moment of the intellect, which occurs already in the 
order of primary intentionality. However, it must not be conceived of as a purely intellectual 
construction, independent from reality. It is an intellectual sign grasp, guided by the cogni-
tion of a thing. It is a guarantee of the reality and applicability of the results of a creative 
process. In creative processes, it is possible to depart significantly from the cognized states of 
things in terms of their construction. However, after all, it is the recognition of the potency 
of matter that all its modifications, adjusting it to the construction structure, are based on. 
Therefore, the formulation of the criterion and its execution does not involve adjusting only 
to the real states of things, but also to the potential disposition of things. Discerning real po-
tency enables one to construct sign systems in an advanced manner. This moment constitutes 
the beginning of formulating the criterion of a creative process. This stage involves not only 
the emergence of the intent of a process, but also the recognition of its end and the manner 
of its externalization. However, it is only confronting the results of thought construction 
operations on signs with sensual material that constitutes a verifiable expression of creativity. 
The extra-mental material processed as a result of this process is the second creative moment, 
manifesting itself in secondary intentionality. Thus, creativity is a process of an intellectual 
transition from primary intentionality to secondary intentionality.
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Conclusions
The presented outline of a philosophical reconstruction of the creative process seeks, in the 
first place, to point out the factors dynamizing this process. The aim is to clarify the basis 
for definitions of creativity, which emphasize the significance of dynamism. The understand-
ing of dynamism is grounded in identifying the relation, which holds between subject and 
object factors in creative processes. This relation is elucidated in terms of intentionality, 
which enables the relationship between the subjective sphere of intellectual cognitive acts and 
potential properties of extra-mental reality. In the first place, the focus is on the possibilities 
of constructing sign systems occurring at an intellectual level. The basis for such thought 
operations is the intentional dimension of the results of a cognitive grasp of states of things. 
Thus, intentionality constitutes the category determining the possibilities of modifying sign 
systems. However, intellectual modification of sign systems takes place in object categories. 
Creative processes begin from a cognitive grasp of real states of things and conclude in results 
expressed in extra-mental sensual matter. Therefore, a definition of creativity should encom-
pass the dynamism that holds between a subjective sphere of possibilities in the semantic 
domain and an objective sphere of potency in the object domain. This is the sphere of form-
ing relations, the motive of whose creation are creative acts, and the moments determining 
relational relationships are intentional factors. Thus, creativity as an act is positioned between 
the extra-cognitive possibilities of a subject (primary intentionality) and reading the potency 
of the extra-mental material (secondary intentionality). The intentional-transformational re-
lation of the two moments constitutes the basis for a creativity process.
In the relational perspective of intentional relations the criterion according to which a cre-
ativity process occurs is a crucial element. The factors affecting the formation of the criterion 
are conditioned by the motive and result of an action, whereas the essence of the criterion 
are possible manners of externalizing intentional sign constructions. The creativity criterion 
constitutes the rules of constructing sign systems and specifies the forms of acceptable trans-
formations, which may be obtained as the result of a creative process. The application of the 
constructed sign systems must allow for the condition of an analogous adaptation to the mat-
ter in which the result of this construction is to be manifested. The analogous grasp is pivotal 
here both for the level of primary and secondary intentionality. In primary intentionality 
there is no constraint of a creative act to disambiguating notional grasps, which leaves a broad 
spectrum of possibilities to construct content intellectually, while in secondary intentionality, 
without an analogous approach it is not possible to recognize the potency of sensual matter, 
which ultimately determines the results of creative processes. Therefore, the criterion also 
entails deliberation on modes executing a creative process. The criterion reaches its culmina-
tion in selecting the construction of a sign system possible to materialize in sensual matter.
In the context of such propositions, one also needs to point out the social significance 
of creative acts. From the moment of the conclusion of a creative process, there begins a 
stage of verifying its results in the intersubjective sphere of interpersonal communication. 
By means of secondary intentionality, creativity unveils its value, which consists primarily 
in the correspondence of the product with the criterion formulated by the creator. In this 
perspective, the appraisal of the value of a product becomes possible. This is enabled by an 
intersubjective dimension of the product and an ever-increasing knowledge of man’s mental 
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states and the laws governing them. At the same time, the analysis of a product in the context 
of the criterion may provide the basis for formulating methods of perfecting creative acts. 
Perfecting creativity is perfecting the manner of recognizing and interpreting the results, 
but also perfecting construction forms of sign systems. This requires not only clarifying the 
rules which will be able to distinguish what is creative, but also determining the criteria of 
evaluating creativity. This provides the grounds for education in creativity.
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